The Dekagram: 9th November

One of the purposes of the Dekagram is to draw to the attention of our readers opportunities that may not have occurred to them; this week Imogen Todd examines two very recent judgments in which witnesses were allowed the services of intermediaries, an under-used resource in the civil courts, although the family and criminal courts have more experience with them. Meanwhile, Megan Bithel-Vaughan considers another in a line of cases on jurisdiction in which the High Court has accepted jurisdiction over a foreign-based defendant, in this case involving foreign-based claimants.

Intermediaries in the Civil Courts: a Growing Trend?

Intermediaries are a familiar feature of family and criminal proceedings, but they are rarely seen in the Business and Property Division. In İşbilen v Turk [2026] EWHC 2722 (BP), the court found a happy medium. Mr Justice Adam Johnson directed that the defendant, Mr Selman Turk, should have an intermediary, but only while giving oral evidence at trial.

An intermediary is a communication specialist appointed to help a vulnerable person. Intermediaries are impartial, independent of the parties and owe their duty to the court. Their role extends to making assessments of communication needs and advising the court on necessary steps to facilitate participation. Intermediaries ensure that proceedings can proceed “justly”, a feature common in the civil, criminal and family overriding objectives.

In İşbilen v Turk, the parties agreed that the governing test comes from the Court of Appeal’s decision in the family case M (A Child): Intermediaries [2025] EWCA Civ 440. The question is whether an intermediary is necessary, for any aspect of the proceedings, to achieve a fair hearing. As Peter Jackson LJ explained, these decisions are person-specific and task-specific.

Mr Turk has a long-standing ADHD diagnosis that affects his ability to pay attention. This was evidenced by 2023 reports from psychiatrist Dr Gupta and intermediary Ms Ficzová. Updated reports were not considered necessary because his condition is consistent and stable. The judge also noted that Mr Turk is intelligent and had previously worked as an analyst at Goldman Sachs.

At the earlier 10-day contempt trial, for which the reports were obtained, an intermediary attended only for openings and cross-examination. Sir Anthony Mann declined intermediary support for closing submissions, and the Court of Appeal ([2024] EWCA Civ 568) upheld his reliance on his own observations of Mr Turk. Sir Anthony found that Mr Turk’s ADHD “in no material way impaired” his evidence, and Johnson J gave that observation considerable weight.

The judge accepted that the 11-week trial would be longer and more complex than the contempt trial. But several features would protect Mr Turk:

• The court will sit only four days a week, which leaves time for briefings.
• Junior counsel will attend throughout, and Mr Turk can raise any loss of focus himself.
• A five-day judicial pre-reading period gives Mr Turk time to prepare with his lawyers.
• The other parties are paying for a daily transcript, so Mr Turk can review anything he missed. The judge called this “highly significant” given the nature of his vulnerability.
• Mrs İşbilen’s evidence, given in Turkish through a translator, will proceed slowly.
• Closing submissions will be in writing, with judicial reading time; at the contempt trial, no intermediary was allowed for closings.

Support during these phases might be desirable but was not considered necessary. The judge was persuaded, “just”, that an intermediary is necessary while Mr Turk gives oral evidence. Because the allegations against Mr Turk include dishonesty, cross-examination is likely to bring heightened anxiety, and anxiety worsens his attention difficulties.

In another civil case last week, TXA v Thames Valley Police, 4^th November 2026 (KB)Lambert J was persuaded to allow an intermediary to assist a vulnerable claimant, who had communication difficulties, with giving a witness statement and during cross-examination at the trial of his personal injury claim against the police. He did not, however, agree that it was necessary to extend the appointment to legal conferences or the rest of the trial, as the claimant’s legal team could implement the communication strategies identified by the intermediary and the trial judge could deploy other available special measures. The court’s rationale for determining the issue in this way was that pursuant to CPR PD 1A the overriding objective required the court to ensure as far as practicable that parties were on an equal footing and could participate fully in proceedings. The vulnerability of a party or witness might impede participation and diminish the quality of evidence, and the court should take all proportionate measures to address such issues. A party or witness might be rendered vulnerable by a communication difficulty, and in this event the court should consider their ability to understand the proceedings, express themselves, put their evidence before the court, comply with court requests, instruct their representative and attend hearings. Where a court had found that a person was vulnerable and their participation or quality of evidence was likely to be diminished as a result, the critical question was whether it was necessary to approve the appointment of an intermediary in order to achieve a fair hearing, as opposed to making some other form of participation direction.

These judgments are a welcome reminder to the civil courts that intermediaries are available and relevant in a civil context. I would go further to remind civil practitioners that intermediaries are ensure that vulnerable parties are understood in court proceedings, maintaining their dignity and access to a fair trial.

About the Author

Imogen Todd was called in 2020. Having completed pupillage at Deka Chambers, including a period under the tutelage of Dominique Smith, she was taken on in October 2025. She now undertakes a broad civil practice, with a strong track record in personal injury, travel claims, inquests, stage 3 hearings, infant approval hearings and credit hire litigation.

Shaw & Greenwood-Nimmo v Stephani [2026] EWHC 2776 (KB)

This article considers the case of Shaw & Greenwood-Nimmo v Stephani [2026] EWHC 2776 (KB), in which Sarah Prager KC, instructed by Christopher Deacon of Stewarts Law, represented the Claimant. 

Introduction and Factual Background

This case considered the question of jurisdiction.  In brief, the facts were as follows. Whilst on holiday, an Australian-resident couple were seriously injured in a car accident in the UK.  The driver of the other car (whose negligence caused the accident) sadly died at the scene.  The Defendant is the mother and administratrix of the deceased driver’s estate, albeit in practicality, the paying party is the deceased driver’s motor insurer, Direct Line, who had indemnified the estate.

The Defendant had admitted liability, subject to jurisdiction and quantum.  The Claimant asserted that the correct jurisdiction was England and Wales.  This decision is the judgment of the Defendant’s application to have the Courts of England and Wales set aside service and decline jurisdiction, asserting that the correct jurisdiction was Australia, specifically the state of Victoria. 

The First Claimant was at all relevant times an Australian national and the Second Claimant held dual citizenship in Australia and Britain.  Both Claimants were resident and domiciled in Australia.  The deceased driver was living in Wales, but was a US citizen and the Defendant (the administratrix of her son’s estate) was at all relevant times a US citizen and resident in the US. 

The Law

The law concerning jurisdiction is well established. The Court referred to the case of Limbu and others v. Dyson Technology Limited and others [2024] EWCA Civ 1564, [2025] 2 All ER (Comm) which contains a helpful summary of the relevant principles, including those contained within the cases of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Limited [1987] AC 460 and Lungowe and others v. Vedanta Resources plc and another [2019] UKSC 20, [2020] AC 1045. These principles are set out for ease below:

• The burden lies on the Claimants to establish the appropriateness of the jurisdiction.  This is achieved through a two stage test:
  • In determining the appropriate jurisdiction, the Court must look at connecting factors to determine with which jurisdiction the action has the most real and substantial connection.  These factors include practical factors (such as convenience and expense) but also residence, where the parties carry out business, the applicable law and where the wrongful act/tort/harm arose.
  • The second stage of this test is that even if the Court determines that the foreign Court is more appropriate by reference to connecting factors, should the Claimant demonstrate, using cogent evidence, that there is a real risk that the Claimant will not be able to obtain substantial justice in the appropriate jurisdiction, the Court of England and Wales can assert jurisdiction.
• The starting point when considering jurisdiction for a tort claim is the location that the tort arose.
• It is generally preferable, all other things being equal, that the case should be tried in the country whose law applies, albeit this factor was of lesser importance in the index case, as there were unlikely to be contentious legal issues. 
• The location of the paying party (including an insurer who is not a party to a claim) is a factor which can be taken into consideration, especially if enforcement is likely to be in issue.  This is a factor, that in the index case, was found to have less weight than some of the other issues.
• The residence of the Claimant is a significant factor, albeit not necessarily a determinative one providing that the Claimants are able and willing to travel.
• The Court should consider the issues that are likely to arise, both in the England and Wales jurisdiction and the foreign jurisdiction.
• The practical demands of litigation (such as the location of experts and any issues arising from disclosure) are a factor, however, they are not always a decisive factor, and the Court retains its discretion, especially to disregard any “casual or adventitious” link between England and Wales and the claim.
• Funding arguments arise at the second stage of the two stage test.
• The Court will generally not give weight to an argument that the Claimant would achieve higher damages in one jurisdiction over another.

Outcome and Conclusion

Applying the facts of this case and considering the various factors, Andrew Kinnier KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge concluded that the connecting factors did not all point the same way, however, he concluded that since the accident and initial injuries and losses were sustained in England; English law applied; the fact that the Claimants did have genuine family and professional ties in England and the fact that the Claimant’s case manager being in England meant that the connection with England was more than “casual and adventitious” and England and Wales was clearly the more appropriate forum. The Court dismissed the Defendant’s application and accepted that England and Wales had jurisdiction over the claim.

This decision reinforces therefore, that even in quantum only claims where the Claimants are habitually resident outside of the jurisdiction and sustaining ongoing losses outside of the jurisdiction, England and Wales can be the appropriate jurisdiction, especially if the tort arose in England and Wales, the Claimants are willing and able to travel, and English law governs the claim. It is also a useful reminder that where remote evidence is now routine, factors such as the location of experts may be less persuasive as arrangements can be made for them to give evidence remotely.

About the Author

Megan Bithel-Vaughan gained tenancy having completed pupillage at Deka Chambers. She has already been led by Sarah Prager KC in a case of significant value involving complex issues around the interpretation of the Montreal Convention, and in particular the interplay between the operation of the partial compensation cap and contributory negligence.