The Dekagram: 24th August 2026

This week the Dekagram considers two sorry tales of strike out: Robbie Parkin regales us with a sad story arising from the scattergun approach all too familiar to those responding to claims brought by litigants in person, whilst Sarah Prager KC examines the dangers inherent in defending a claim which might otherwise constitute an abuse of process.

KDY & Anor v Langham & Ors [2026] EWHC 2068 (KB)[1]: a Procedural Response to Scattergun Litigation

KDY is a case which forms part of a pattern which will be familiar to a number of practitioners. It is a sorry reflection on the times in which we live, but one many readers of this article will have to prepare for.

The scene is familiar. A litigant, almost always acting in person, constructs a mental narrative in which they, or often their family, are subject to an unrelenting campaign of mistreatment by a very wide range of unrelated parties in a baffling array of ways, and weaves a complicated, creaking narrative out of these events. The sad reality is often that they have faced no more than the ordinary vicissitudes of life. 

Pleadings are detailed and forcefully put, but are normally bizarre, prolix, irrelevant, and sometimes completely incoherent. The sums claimed are grossly inflated, rarely with a shred of evidential justification.

Lawyers- including the author- are not beyond a candid admission of frustration at this. Many of us will have had to spend a long and tiring day attempting to reply coherently to a lengthy, unanswerable tirade. Defendants and their insurers are still more understandably irritated- the costs incurred are often wholly irrecoverable, even if they succeed. Some Defendants are not institutional or insured, and face the consequences out of their own pocket. One hopes that their insured employers will provide cover.

But there can be an element of genuine tragedy for the litigant, and that should not be forgotten. The financial consequences of their misjudgment can be catastrophic. Legal advice or even judicial directions which might avert or reduce loss will go unheeded. More often than might be expected, entirely legitimate, if more modest, claims or other grievances are hidden- and lost- within the nonsense.

The motives of these litigants are many, but poor mental health and genuine societal disadvantage- albeit in a more abstract sense than they allege- are rarely far beneath the surface. Most are misguided rather than malicious. At least some degree of sympathy, even begrudgingly, is still needed.

In such circumstances, it pays to be cruel to be kind. A prompt application for summary judgment or strike out reduces the cost incurred by both parties, and, if done right, brings the matter to a conclusion as swiftly as possible. This was, correctly, the approach taken by each of the Defendants on this occasion.

This Case

KDY was a multi-cause of action, multi-defendant case cut from this cloth.

The First Claimant is a child with autism, ADHD, and other diagnosed conditions, who had been subject to an Education, Health and Care Plan since 2018. The Second Claimant, his mother and litigation friend, also brought claims in her own right. She had acted as a litigant in person throughout.

The claim was brought against nine, ten, or eleven Defendants (the tenth and the eleventh having been arguably improperly added, at various stages). The cast of Defendants included head teachers sued personally, school governing bodies, a local authority, an NHS Trust, a housing association running youth services, and the London Legacy Development Corporation.

The claim alleged negligence and personal injury, Equality Act 2010 discrimination, defamation, breaches of human rights, and misfeasance in public office, seeking damages in excess of £2.8 million.

Particulars of Claim ran to 247 pages (with an additional 50 pages of annexes), comprising 1,009 paragraphs. This was served alongside a 574-page “medical evidence bundle” and a separate “quantum bundle.” The Second Claimant then served a further 76 pages of witness statements, exhibits, and a series of “matrix documents” and attempted to tie all this together with a “Judicial Roadmap” which “simply serve[d] to highlight the repetitious, needlessly prolix, confusing and scattergun nature of the [Particulars]”.

The author adopts the observation of Turner J in Sheikh v Page & Anor [2017] EWHC 1772 (QB)[2] at §41 in a similar case:  “Comment would be superfluous.”

The Issues

All of the Defendants had acknowledged service, and had then applied for strike out of, or summary judgment on, all or parts of the Claim, in various ways. None had filed a Defence- CPR 3.4(7) meant that they did not have to. Ultimately this proved a wise decision- the cost of attempting a Defence would have been significant, and, as events proved, a wasted exercise.

In fairness to the Second Claimant, she was a litigant in person, likely to be confused by the requirements of court procedure, and did have significant vulnerabilities of her own.  Directions were given at an early stage to signpost the Claimant to the rules she would need to comply with, though this ultimately was not done.

Reasonable adjustments were made to the hearing procedure, for example, the hearing was managed to allow the Second Claimant to respond to each topic in turn. Nevertheless, the court emphasised, Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12[3], the bottom line is that that litigant-in-person status does not lower the standard of compliance with the rules.

Claims of this nature very often include a personal injury claim, usually seeking some form of psychiatric injury. This was no exception. However, a Claimant who wishes to pursue a personal injury claim will inevitably need to rely upon a CPR 35 compliant medico-legal report. CPR PD16 para.4 requires that a Claimant who wishes to rely upon such a report must do so with their Particulars of Claim.

Of the many examples the author has seen, none have ever complied with this requirement, and, again, this was no exception. While medical records were included (at length) no report was; a common error.

The Defendants argued that this failure warranted strike-out. However, the court held, following Mark v Universal Coatings [2018] EWHC 3206 (QB)[4], that non-compliance with PD 16.4.3 alone would not be sufficiently serious to justify striking out the claim. It was a factor that the court took into consideration, but not a significant one.

The Second Claimant, as is again not unusual, brought a personal injury claim in her own right, as a secondary victim of what she considered to be mistreatment of the First Claimant by the Defendants. However, in Paul & Anor v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1[5], the court held that:

“a person who has suffered psychiatric injury from witnessing the death of a close relative, or its immediate aftermath, from a medical condition which a doctor or health authority had negligently failed to diagnose and treat, is not entitled to claim damages as a secondary victim[6].”

The court extended this to the Defendants in the present case:

“I also consider that to the extent that any of the other defendants were under a statutory duty to C1 which could give arguably rise to a common law duty of care (which is not accepted by the defendants), they were not under an independent direct duty to prevent consequential psychiatric injuries or consequential losses to C2 as his mother and carer.”

The Second Claimant’s claims were struck out on that basis.

As noted above, it is not unusual for a legitimate claim to be hidden within the volume of material produced by the litigant. In this case, that was a clinical negligence claim brought by the First Claimant against the Eighth Defendant. While having a potentially proper legal basis, the pleadings were completely inadequate, lacking the most basic requirements of such a claim, and pleaded claims of a kind which did not exist.

Ultimately, the court declined to sever this claim from the rest- not least as the Second Claimant opposed such an order- but expressly stated that this should not be taken as a bar to a future properly pleaded claim, particularly as the First Claimant is a child and limitation is not an immediate concern. This does imply that, in another case, a different approach might have been preferred.

Most of the rest fell away quickly. The whole of the Equality Act 2010 claims were struck out for want of jurisdiction[7], and for the most part, limitation[8].

The Human Rights Act claims were struck out in part on limitation grounds[9], and the remainder on the merits under CPR 3.4.

The claims for misfeasance in public office failed to meet the Three Rivers District Council & Ors v The Governor & Company of the Bank of England Rev 1 [2003] EWCA Civ 474[10] threshold. Bad faith or malice, and not mere negligence, was required.

Claims for aggravated, exemplary, and provisional damages were also struck out as inadequately pleaded.

Lastly, a number of clams against the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Defendants were struck out on grounds of cause of action estoppel, identical claims having already been determined in refused judicial review proceedings.

The net result was that none of the Claim survived, and it was struck out entirely.

Summary

Clearly, there is a lot to break down here, but a few important practice points emerge. My observations are these:

1. Ill conceived, prolix, multi-defendant, in person, scattergun litigation is a sad reality and most institutions with significant contact with the public should be prepared to face them. As here, it is not unusual for Claimants to target individuals alongside, or instead of, institutions. Employers will have to be prepared to intervene to protect staff members.
2. A prompt, if seemingly aggressive, application for strike out or summary judgment is often the right way to handle litigation of this kind. It may dispose of the claim entirely, or at least very significantly manage the issues by way of directions or unless orders. 
3. It can be sensible to run this application prior to the defence- it is possible to avoid incurring the costs of doing so, which may well not be recoverable.
4. Many such litigants, however they present themselves, are acutely vulnerable and it is axiomatic that reasonable measures should be put in place to reflect this. Ultimately, however, the duties on a litigant in person are no different to a represented party.
5. Many errors simply form part of a picture and are not sufficient grounds themselves for strike out (for example, here, failure to serve medical reports). They can be relied as part of a greater whole but in themselves are more likely to warrant an unless order- though that has some value in itself.
6. There are more fundamental errors, however. As here, many litigants in person will misunderstand the significance of the correct party bringing the claim; or rules relating to limitation or jurisdiction; or even the need to properly plead a claim at all. These are the kind of failings much more likely to warrant summary disposal.
7. All of this may hide a legitimate claim, which Defendants must be prepared for. While it seems very unlikely that a litigant in person proposing to set off on such litigation will read this article- and it is necessarily written from a Defendant perspective- the author would nevertheless add this: – it may well be the grievance, or some of it, has merit; but the manner of the pleadings does not. Professional assistance is available, often at no direct cost, and does actually work. Even at this hearing, it may possibly have been that a part of the Claimants’ case could have been preserved, with a different strategy.
8. Lastly, while it did not arise in this case, there is directional overlap between litigants in cases of this kind and cases brought by vexatious litigants. It may be worth brushing up on the requirements and effects of various forms of Civil Restraint Order[11]– these are not as complex or rare as they appear.

About the Author

Robert Parkin was called in 2009. He has a mixed civil practice, including in the area of travel and cross-border claims. He was junior drafting counsel in Barclay-Watts & Others v Alpha Paraneti & Others [2019] HQ11X02379, a substantial cross border dispute involving mis-selling of holiday lets in Cyprus. 

A Remedy of Last Resort:  Xenfin Fund 1 Trading Limited (in liquidation) v GFG Limited & Others [2026] EWHC 2158 (Ch)

In a judgment delivered on the last day of term, Mr Justice Michael Green refused to strike out a claim brought by an insolvent Guernsey investment vehicle against its alleged investment manager, allowed the claimant to amend its pleadings, and sent the dispute on to a 16-day trial listed for March 2027. The decision in Xenfin Fund 1 Trading Limited is a useful reminder of the high threshold a defendant must clear before a court will deploy the draconian remedy of strike out, and of the risks a defendant runs by defending on the merits for years before alleging abuse of process.

The Facts

The claimant, Xenfin Fund 1 Trading Limited, is a Guernsey special purpose vehicle within a fund group whose parent is GFG Funds PCC Limited, a protected cell company. The claimant was the SPV through which one of the cells, the Xenfin Securitised Debt Fund 1 Cell, made its investments. The first defendant, GFG Limited, is an investment manager regulated by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission. The second to fourth defendants were directors of, or are said to have owed fiduciary duties to, the claimant.

The case concerns loans the claimant made to entities associated with the Dolphin Group, purportedly secured over real estate developments in rural Germany. The Dolphin Group collapsed, and its owner faces criminal charges over an alleged fraudulent pyramid scheme that took hundreds of millions of euros from investors. A further transaction, the “Vordere Transaction”, swapped the security for the Dolphin loans into shares said to have been significantly overvalued. The claimant alleges that GFG, as its investment manager, breached its duties to exercise reasonable skill and care in causing it to make those investments.

The central issue on the applications was whether GFG was ever contractually appointed as the claimant’s investment manager, and if so on what terms. Three documents framed the debate. The “2014 IMA”, between GFG PCC and GFG, established the group’s investment management arrangements and, critically, contained a clause 11 limiting GFG’s liability save for fraud, gross negligence or wilful default, together with an indemnity. It is common ground, however, that the claimant, incorporated only in 2017, was never added to that agreement. The “2017 IMA”, between the claimant, Xenfin Capital (as advisor) and GFG (as manager), did not expressly appoint GFG as the claimant’s manager but, the claimant says, was premised on GFG already occupying that role. A Board Resolution and the cell’s 2018 accounts, which recorded substantial management fees paid to GFG, completed the picture.

The claimant’s primary case is that there was an “Unwritten IMA”, reached orally or by conduct within a two-week window in March 2017, under which GFG agreed to act as its investment manager. In the alternative, it relies on the 2017 IMA. GFG’s position is that the only relevant agreement is the 2014 IMA, with its liability cap and indemnity, and it counterclaimed for a declaration to that effect.

The Applications

GFG applied to strike out the claim or for reverse summary judgment on three grounds:

• the “Pleading Ground” (no reasonable grounds and/or no real prospect of success);
• the “Nomura Ground” (that issuing proceedings was itself an abuse);
• the “Conflict Ground” (that a shared liquidator gave rise to an unmanaged conflict amounting to abuse).

The claimant cross-applied for permission to amend its Particulars of Claim and Reply. The judge indicated at the hearing that he was unpersuaded by the latter two grounds raised by the defendant’s application, and heard full argument on the Pleading Ground and the amendment.

Acquiescence and Inconsistent Positions

The claimant ran two preliminary points: that GFG had acquiesced in the claim by defending on the merits for years, and that GFG had impermissibly adopted inconsistent evidential positions. On acquiescence, the judge drew on the decision in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, noting Lord Millett’s view that a defendant who defends on the merits should be taken to have acquiesced where the abuse alleged protects the defendant’s own interests, and Lord Bingham’s observation that a long failure to strike out is potent evidence that the claim was not abusive. The judge held that acquiescence had no application to a pure pleading complaint, but was relevant to the Nomura and Conflict Grounds. He declined to decide the applications on either preliminary point, but treated GFG’s earlier position in proceedings — that disclosure and oral evidence would be needed to determine the terms on which GFG acted — as an important factor weighing against summary disposal.

The Pleading Ground Rejected

The judge reaffirmed the stringent test for strike out: the court must be sure the claim is bound to fail, and will strive to uphold pleadings capable of cure by amendment. He found the Unwritten IMA identified in its two forms, with duty, breach and causation adequately particularised. While the particulars did not give chapter and verse of the words used, as CPR PD16 paragraph 7.4 contemplates, that provision says “should” rather than “must”, and there were particulars of the conduct relied upon. Crucially, GFG had understood the claim for two and a half years and had never sought further particulars. Applying the Easyair principles, and mindful that the SecuriSync repository of over 44,000 documents remained to be reviewed and that former directors were to give evidence, the judge held the claim had a real prospect of success. Striking out would be wholly disproportionate — echoing the Court of Appeal’s reluctance, even in the recent egregious “privilege hunting” case of Pliego v Astor Asset Management [2025] EWHC 2968, to strike out an otherwise good claim.

The Amendment Allowed

The proposed amendment made explicit an alternative case that the 2014 IMA terms were agreed in March 2017 to be replicated between GFG and the claimant. Applying the four-stage test in Geo-Minerals GT Ltd v Downing [2023] EWCA Civ 648, the judge held that no new cause of action was introduced; it remained the same unwritten contract with slightly different terms, arising from the same March 2017 inquiry already central to the case. He granted permission to amend.

The Remaining Grounds

The Nomura Ground — that issuing the claim form was an abuse because the claimant could not then formulate its claim — was dismissed as “outlandish” once the pleading had been found properly formulated, and in any event it was barred by acquiescence. The Conflict Ground, based on the shared liquidator Mr Wright, failed at all three hurdles: any conflict was normal within a small-jurisdiction group liquidation, was resolved by his resignation on the day the claim was issued, and could be managed through disclosure rather than remedied by strike out.

Comment

The strike out application was dismissed, the amendment allowed, and the matter will proceed to trial. Xenfin v GFG is a yet further illustration of the rule that strike out and summary judgment remain remedies of last resort, especially where disclosure and witness evidence can realistically be expected to illuminate a genuinely contested factual issue; and underlines that a defendant who litigates on the merits for a substantial period may well find that his or her ability to make an application on the basis of abuse of process vanishes as a result. If in doubt, then, an application for strike out or summary judgment should be considered and made at the earliest possible opportunity, if only for the purpose of clarifying the claimant’s case and penalising them on costs.

About the Author

Called to the Bar in 1997, Sarah Prager KC has been listed in the legal directories in travel and personal injury law for many years, and, more recently, listed in aviation as well. Together with Matthew Chapman KC, Jack Harding, Dominique Smith and Tom Yarrow, she co-writes the leading legal textbook in the area, and has been involved in most of the leading cases in the field in the last few decades. She undertakes purely domestic high value personal injury work as well as cross border work and has a wealth of experience of difficult and sensitive cases, including serious sexual assault and cases involving children.

[1] https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2026/2068.html

[2] https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2017/1772.html

[3] https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2018/12.html

[4] https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2018/3206.html

[5] https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2024/1.html

[6] See KDY at §§116-7

[7] Such a claim must be brought in England in the County Court, see s.114 EA 2010

[8] See s.118 EA 2010

[9] See s.7(5) HRA 1998

[10] https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/474.html

[11] https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part03/pd_part03c