The Dekagram: 21st September 2026

The team had a lovely time in Rome this week, attending the PEOPIL annual conference, sightseeing and eating its own weight in pasta and gelato. Julia Brechtelsbauer gave a presentation on claims arising from baby loss, and we were fascinated to hear from Giacomo Travaglino and Marco Bona and from Sean Domnick on the Italian and American experience respectively. The pleasure and interest to be had from discussing comparative law with likeminded colleagues is one of the best things about attending PEOPIL conferences – we hope to see our readers in Malaga in due course at the joint maritime and tourism & sports conference. In the meantime, there is much interest to be had from legal developments closer to home – this week Dominique Smith examines a sad case involving dishonesty and the love a parent has for their child, whilst Anirudh Mandagere brings news of a consultation on inquests potentially involving unlawful killing.

The Consequences of Dishonesty

How does a court deal with a situation whereby a litigant claims that they falsified their original defence to a claim to protect their child? This interesting issue was considered in the High Court last week by Master Stevens in the tragic case of KDP and others v TXL, UK Insurance Ltd and RXS [2026] EWHC 2365 (KB).

Factual background

This claim has somewhat of a lengthy history, which is important to set out to demonstrate how the court reached its conclusions at the later hearings in this case.

The Claimants had taken a family break at the seaside in Ramsgate in the summer of 2022. The group consisted of a husband (DXH) and his wife (GXK) who was pregnant, their 5-year-old and 8-year-old children, together with GXK’s father (LTW).

The Third Party (TXL) was driving an Alfa Romeo vehicle whilst under the influence of drugs. Whilst driving, TXL mounted the pavement where the family were walking, killing both GXK and LTW. TXL fled the scene of the accident and called his father, RXS, for help. He said his father persuaded him to give himself up to the police, and he later admitted failing to stop at the scene and pleaded guilty to various offences. In December 2022, TXL was sentenced to a prison term of 16 years. Thereafter, TXL, RXS and RXS’s wife were also charged with perverting the course of justice (in relation to TXL returning to the scene of the accident with his parents, his parents removing cocaine and TXL’s mobile from the crashed vehicle whilst GXK lay dying beneath it, and then returning home and cleaning TXL’s bedroom of evidence of drug use), which they pleaded guilty to and were subsequently sentenced.

Various claims were consequently brought, asserting that the Alfa Romeo was owned by RXS and insured by him with the Part 20 Claimant (UKIL), and that TXL was driving with the owner’s consent. Although TXL was not a named driver on RXS’s policy, TXL had, it was believed, his own policy issued by Haven Insurance, with third party cover to drive other vehicles provided that he had the owner’s consent. Haven was initially named as a Third Defendant to the proceedings.

All but two of those claims were settled following approval hearings. In respect of the two remaining claims, UKIL filed a Defence denying liability, averring that by Section 151(5) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, Haven was obliged to meet any judgment obtained by the Claimants.

Haven also filed a Defence, arguing that it was UKIL who were obliged to meet any judgment, not Haven, because UKIL issued the policy covering the Alfa Romeo at the time of the accident. Further, although Haven’s policy did cover TXL to drive vehicles other than his Hyundai, it did not cover him to drive any vehicle (including the Alfa Romeo) for business or courier use. At the time of this accident, TXL was couriering drugs in the course of his business as a drug dealer, thus he was not covered by Haven. In addition, Haven voided the insurance policy from inception on the grounds that TXL did not disclose a number of motoring convictions.

TXL did not respond to the claims thus default judgment was entered against him, and on the basis UKIL or Haven would satisfy the judgment debt.

A preliminary trial was listed on 4^th July 2024 to consider the dispute between UKIL and Haven as to who would be responsible for satisfying the judgments in favour of the Claimants. However, shortly before the trial was due to commence, the dispute was compromised on the basis that UKIL would satisfy the judgment pursuant to Section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The Claimants were given permission to discontinue their claims against Haven, which they subsequently did.

Part 20 claims were issued in March 2025 for recovery against TXL and RXS. TXL acknowledged in his Part 20 Defence that he was to blame for the collision. However, he thereafter applied to amend his Defence to add details about the ownership, insurance and control of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The draft amended Defence omitted any reference to his liability and sought to argue that:

1. The Alfa Romeo remained in ownership by TXL’s wife and RXS only insured it for administrative reasons;
2. TXL’s insurance with Haven was voided unlawfully;
3. UKIL should not seek recoupment from TXL or RXS.

TXL also sought to strike out UKIL’s claim against him.

RXS also filed a Part 20 Defence, asserting that TXL was “driving a vehicle registered in my name and insured under my policy” at the time of the collision. It further noted: “I have given him permission to use my car on that occasion, under the belief and understanding that he would be using it for lawful purposes…” RXS then proceeded in a draft amended Defence to allege that in fact it was incorrect that he was the owner of the Alfa Romeo and that he had given his son permission to drive. He expressed “regret” that his previous Defence was not wholly truthful. His new amended case was that:

1. RXS was wrong to tell UKIL he was the owner of the Alfa Romeo as that was only an intention;
2. RXS did not give permission for use of the vehicle and could not have done so as he was not a person who was insured under Section 151;
3. RXS did not have sufficient control of the vehicle to permit its use;
4. RXS had no insurable interest in the Alfa Romeo and in the insurance policy issued to him was cancelled.

Several applications were therefore put before the court:

• UKIL’s application for summary judgment against TXL and RXS;
• TXL’s application to strike out UKIL’s Part 20 claim against him as it disclosed no reasonable grounds and had no prospects of success;
• TXL’s application to amend his Defence and RXS’s application to withdraw the admissions made in his Part 20 Defence and for both TXL and RXS to amend their Defences.

Master Stevens solely dealt with the third set of applications.

The determination of the applications

Dealing first with TXL’s application to amend his Defence, this was refused. Master Stevens noted that TXL had been aware for many years that serious consequences could flow from the accident and the importance of providing an accurate narrative of what actually occurred. Despite that, he maintained two different accounts as to ownership and control of the vehicle at the material time, which Master Stevens considered he proffered “as “the truth” on different occasions to suit himself”. The documents presented by TXL to support the amendment did not provide a good factual basis for deciding there was a realistic prospect of success of finding RXS never owned or controlled the use of the Alfa Romeo. Master Stevens did not find anything sufficiently persuasive about the documents themselves to make them an important factor for allowing the amendments sought. She considered that the prejudice to UKIL would be far greater than even a punitive award of costs could compensate and that UKIL had “most certainly been significantly “mucked around” in my assessment”. Given that TXL had been aware of the civil claim since at least April 2023 and only sent a letter to the Court in November 2025 (followed by an application in February 2026) seeking to advance a different narrative, this was a late application without good explanation.

In terms of RXS’s application, Master Stevens considered it relevant that he had known since at least 19^th January 2023 that UKIL might seek to recover their accident outlay from him personally. His current Defence, dated 3^rd April 2025, admitted he owned and controlled the Alfa Romeo at the time of the accident and gave permission for its use by TXL. His application to withdraw the admissions did not meet the threshold of any other previous, successful applications before the court. Master Stevens agreed with UKIL’s submission that the withdrawals sought were not because the original pleading was “accidental or ambiguous”, but rather because RXS had now stated he had deliberately falsified his original statement of case on the basis that he was a loving parent and did what was understandable to protect his son. She considered that to allow the admission to be withdrawn would be a perverse outcome, which could be viewed by other motor insurance policy holders who subsequently become court users as an encouragement that giving what RXS claimed to be a false testimony persistently over the years, and having signed a statement of truth on court documents, could simply be undone by paying a costs penalty. As such, the application was also refused.

Comment

This is certainly a unique case, providing a significant reminder of the law relating to amendments and withdrawals. It is interesting that Master Stevens refers to a floodgates argument of what the permission of such withdrawals could do on the basis of an individual’s repetitive dishonesty, in that it could simply just encourage arguments that such conduct could be rectified by costs penalties. As Master Stevens set out in her closing remarks, the breaking of the duty to give a true account at all times potentially exposes individuals to drastic consequences, as it ultimately did here.

About the author

Ranked by the Legal 500 2021, 2022 and 2023 and by Chambers and Partners 2023 as a Rising Star, Dominique Smith was called in 2016 and has a busy practice in travel law. She undertakes work for both Claimants and Defendants in package travel claims, contractual disputes, and other related claims. Dominique has a particular interest in cross-border clinical negligence claims and regularly appears in the Coroners’ Courts.

“Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: the Government consults on unlawful killing conclusions

On 14 September 2026, the Ministry of Justice opened a consultation asking whether the standard of proof for the short-form inquest conclusion of unlawful killing should shift from the civil standard (“on the balance of probabilities”) back to the criminal standard (“beyond reasonable doubt”).

What is the present law?

Historically, the conclusions of suicide and unlawful killing required the criminal standard, reflecting their perceived closeness to criminal liability. This changed with the Supreme Court’s ruling in R (Maughan) v HM Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire [2020] UKSC 46. This held that all inquest conclusions (short-form and narrative) should be determined on the civil standard. The Court reasoned that this was consistent with other non-criminal proceedings, did not create criminal liability, and removed the illogicality of applying different standards to conclusions serving the same fact-finding purpose. It was also concerned that the higher standard could leave bereaved families without answers.

Why consult?

The Ministry of Justice records that some stakeholders argue the change created confusion and an “uneven playing field,” particularly in deaths involving state intervention. A person might be acquitted of homicide at a criminal trial (beyond reasonable doubt), yet an inquest could still conclude unlawful killing on the lower civil standard, creating a perception of inconsistency. Contributors also raised concerns about the effect on those in high-risk roles such as firearms policing, including morale and recruitment.

In October 2024, the Government commissioned a Rapid Review, conducted by Sir Adrian Fulford and Tim Godwin, whose report was published on 24 October 2025. It recommended wider public engagement on whether the civil standard remains appropriate. The reviewers noted that changing the standard would not affect a coroner’s ability to make detailed narrative findings or issue Prevention of Future Deaths Reports.

Scope and Impact

This consultation is for evidence-gathering only. It does not presume any change, nor that the current approach is inappropriate. However, any change would apply to all unlawful killing inquests. This would include deaths in healthcare, workplaces, and other settings. Unlawful killing conclusions are rare. They average under 0.5% of inquests annually, and no economic impact assessment has been undertaken.

Conclusion

The consultation poses nine questions covering impacts on affected sectors, fairness, public confidence, bereaved families, and equalities. Responses are invited by 7 December 2026.

About the Author

Anirudh Mandagere was called in 2019 and now has a broad practice across all areas of chambers’ specialisms, acting for both claimants and defendants. Before joining Deka Anirudh worked as a judicial assistant at the Court of Appeal and taught law at the London School of Economics. He is ranked as a “rising star” (Legal 500) and “up and coming” (Chambers and Partners). He is described as someone who is “always well prepared for the fight”, “clear, knowledgeable and informative to clients”, “very bright”, “a future star…really impressive, very conscientious and level-headed”, with a “kind touch with all clients to give them reassurance and support”.