The Dekagram: 20th July 2026

This week Julia Brechtelsbauer confirms that the Court of Appeal tends not to allow appeals on the basis that Something Might Turn Up, whilst Tom Collins examines an interesting first instance judgment which reiterates the importance of Pleading Everything From the Outset.

Stop the Clock: Limits on Waiting for Foreign Law to Change

In a recent case, the Court of Appeal have addressed whether to remit a case to await upcoming judgments in a foreign jurisdiction. The application was refused, and the case provides a useful insight into the courts’ approach where Foreign Law is (allegedly!) subject to change.

The facts of the case are as follows:

• An automobile dealer (the appellant) claimed for compensation and/or indemnification under Palestinian Law No.2 of 2000.
• This was due to a termination of a distributor agreement by the automobile manufacturer (the respondent).
• The agreement was governed by English law, but the respondent terminated the agreement without cause by giving 12 months under Article 18 of the Commercial Agents Law (Palestinian Law No.2 of 2000).
• The appellant relied on clause 19.1 of the agreement which provided a right to compensation on termination if ‘expressly mandated by national law’.
• The trial judge held that the appellant did not qualify as a ‘commercial agent’ under Palestinian Law.

Kerish International Motors Agency appealed against the decision dismissing its claim for compensation and/or indemnification. The High Court found that ‘national law’ meant Palestinian law and rejected the appellant’s claim on the grounds that it was not a commercial agent within the scope of the Commercial Agents Law. The substantive appeal was dismissed, but the interesting point for Dekagram purposes is that the appellant shortly before the appeal in the Court of Appeal applied for the case to be remitted to the High Court to await and consider further decisions anticipated from the Palestinian Courts.

After the judgment of the English High Court, (dated 7^th May 2024) two further decisions of the Palestinian Court of first instance were promulgated (Thorn Lighting and Japan Tobacco). The Respondent first sought to rely upon the same through an application to adduce fresh evidence. In response, the Appellant issued an application notice on 5^th June 2025 to rely on fresh evidence in the form of a further report. Neither application was determined. Judgment was given in Thorn Lighting by the Palestinian Court of Appeal where the decision was upheld. The Respondent then no longer sought to rely upon the decisions. It argued that remission would be unnecessary and disproportionate, and invited the court to determine the appeal without admitting further evidence. The Appellant applied for the case to be remitted for the following reasons:

1. A decision from the Palestinian Court of Appeal in Japan Tobacco was due within 3-5 months and the fact that the Court had appointed experts on quantum suggested that they were intending to overturn the first instance decision.
2. The decision of Court of Cassation in Thorn Lighting (the Court above in hierarchy to the Court of Appeal) was expected shortly.

It was submitted that these were likely to have an important hearing on the issue of Palestinian Law and the appeal should not be heard where it could be based on a misunderstanding of Palestinian Law in the light of imminent Palestinian court decisions. The Respondent opposed the application, and supplied a witness statement in support by the Respondent’s Palestinian law expert.

There was a disagreement as to how long it would take for the above cases to be heard. It was suggested that Cassation appeals can take up to 32 months between filing and then decision.

Lord Justice Popplewell pointed out: “Further, what is to happen if after the Court of Cassation has delivered Judgment in Japan Tobacco and Thorn Lighting, without it assisting Kerish’s argument, there is a further case awaiting appeal to the highest court which might do so? The logic of Kerish’s argument is that there should be yet further delay in the remitted hearing taking place in the High Court, to await the outcome of that case.” [§40].

It was further highlighted that it is “entirely uncertain” whether the pending decisions would actually assist the Appellant [§41]. The Respondent disagreed that the appointment of quantum experts suggested that the appeal would be successful, and highlighted other cases in that respect. It was also emphasised that cases can settle and the issues in both cases may mean that the decision of the court may not address the issue which arises in the current case. Further, the facts of those cases were not on all fours with the facts of the current case.

Therefore, Lord Justice Popplewell said “It is a matter of pure speculation whether awaiting a final decision by the highest Court in both cases will result in a decision which provides assistance on the point which arises in this case. And there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that if so, it will be a decision in favour of the argument for which Kerish contends. Kerish’s invitation to await further decisions of the Palestinian Courts is no more than Micawberism.” [§42]

And finally, “To remit the case for an indefinite period, which may well be measured in years, for the purposes of that speculative possibility is contrary to the interests of finality in litigation, both in terms of the reasonable expectations of Opel and the public interest in finality and the efficient use of court resources. This appeal has already been delayed by a year as a result of the difficulty surrounding recognition of Palestine by HMG. It would in my view be wrong in principle and disproportionate to remit the matter now. As Mr George put it, it is necessary to “stop the clock” at some point. That point is normally the conclusion of the trial which is the “first and last night of the show”. There is nothing in the circumstances of the present case which would justify departure from that general rule” [§43].

As is usual, it appears that the decision was based on the strength of the evidence before the court. The Appellant did not supply any expert evidence explaining the importance of the decision, whereas the Respondent supported its opposition through a witness statement from the legal expert. That meant that they were able to gainsay assertions made by the Appellant, such as that the instruction of quantum experts suggested that the decision would be overturned on appeal.

About the Author

Julia Brechtelsbauer gained tenancy having completed pupillage at Deka Chambers. Before coming to the Bar, she took an LLM in Comparative Private Law at the University of Edinburgh, and during this time she also tutored tort and EU law privately at undergraduate level. Studying Law with Spanish Law at the University of Oxford, Julia came first in her cohort in EU Law and Comparative Private Law, placing 5th overall. She has also been published by the Oxford University Undergraduate Law Journal, focusing on the defence of illegality in tort law. She has already been led by Sarah Prager KC in a paraplegia case involving complex issues around assumption of responsibility and is developing a thriving practice in international work.

The Price of Disappointment

Yorkshire Yurts Limited v Crane & Easterby [2026] EWCC 41 (HHJ Walsh, York County Court 9 July 2026)

We at Deka Chambers take an interest (professional, of course) in the many ways the pursuit of pleasure can go wrong: the Arctic cruise that gets stuck in ice, the excursion on a cantankerous Bactrian camel. This week brings a variation on the theme – a wedding, a yurt, and a county court appeal which is nonetheless the most useful thing said about sections 24 and 56 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for some time. Anyone in the habit of pleading “a refund plus something for the distress” should read it first.

The facts and first instance decision

Ms Crane and Mr Easterby hired a yurt, marquee, catering tent and furniture for their June 2024 wedding, at a price of £16,504. Once erected, the yurt proved too dangerous to use; the flooring was damaged and the furniture broken. The day was salvaged, at the last minute and at some cost, by a substitute marquee.

The particulars of claim were, as HHJ Walsh observed with a restraint which itself repays study, “as confused as they were confusing”: they alleged one breach: that the defendant “failed to install and provide adequate equipment”. They pleaded no express term, no statutory implied term and no distress, and sought a “refund” of the whole price plus the cost of substitute hire – on its face, double recovery.

That matters because a refund is not a common law remedy at all. It is a creature of statute: the right to a price reduction under section 24 (goods) and section 56 (services) of the CRA. The claimants had thus pleaded a term they could not identify, a statutory remedy with no implied term to trigger it, and had not pleaded distress at all.

The District Judge nonetheless allowed reliance on the implied terms in sections 9, 10 and 48, found them breached, and awarded a price reduction in two parts: £7,115.60 for the unusable yurt and defective items, and £10,000 for distress, capped (a price reduction cannot exceed the price) at £16,504.

Only the distress element was appealed, on the basis there was no claim for general damages and the £10,000 award could only have been justified as part of the price reduction itself.

The decision on appeal

HHJ Walsh held that a price reduction starts with the contract price and takes something off it. The price is what the parties themselves put on full performance, and so fixes the limits of the remedy: it may be reduced by nothing, or by the whole price, but never more (§§71–75). Its purpose is to limit what the consumer must pay to the value of what the consumer actually got – not to put the consumer where they would have been had the contract been performed. Consequential losses “form no part of the trader’s contractual performance” (§78); they sound in common law damages, preserved by sections 19 and 54.

But – and this is the important point – value is not confined to what is measurable in purely economic terms.

“Where the contract, or an important part of it, is for the provision of pleasurable amenity, the amenity is not a separate line item on the breakdown. It is an inherent feature of the contract included within the total contract price” (§93). The court therefore asks what element of the price is attributable to the amenity, and takes it off if the amenity was not delivered. The Explanatory Notes to section 56 supports that approach: it gives the example of trader providing a service where it has promised to pay its workers a living wage; if this was an important factor to them in choosing the trader the consumer may have a right to a price reduction if this proved not to be the case, even though it does not affect the service itself.

The answer is accordingly that a price reduction may include a (usually, modest) sum for the loss of an amenity the contract was intended to confer – enjoyment, freedom from worry. A consumer who wishes to recover a more substantial amount for distress is required to bring a claim for general damages, just as they are if they wish to recover any other kind of consequential loss.

Why this matters to travel practitioners

The distinction is not unique to the CRA. Regulation 16 of the PTRs draws the same line: an “appropriate price reduction” for the lack of conformity (reg 16(2)), and separately “appropriate compensation” for damage sustained as a result of it (reg 16(3)) – the latter, since Leitner v TUI (C-168/00), including non-material damage. So does the common law: Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 389 confirms that diminution in value is to be distinguished from consequential loss, inconvenience and distress.

Practice points

• Plead the implied terms. Sections 9, 10 and 49 (or reg 16, for packages) are what trigger the statutory remedy. Alleging breach of an “adequacy” term that is not in the contract is no use.
• Plead both remedies, alternatively. A refund and damages do different jobs. If you want to claim for distress, a claim for general damages must be included in the prayer
• Plead the amenity. If the object of the contract was pleasure or peace of mind, say so, and say what was lost. It cannot be smuggled in through the witness statements: parties “are not routinely permitted to run claims from their evidence rather than their pleadings” (§158).

About the Author

Called in 2010, Tom Collins is ranked in Chambers and Partners in travel: international personal injury and in the Legal 500 as a leading junior in personal injury. He is said by clients to be ‘exceptionally bright’, an ‘excellent advocate’ and ‘extremely well prepared and very empathetic’. He has considerable experience across a wide range of travel and private international law disputes and has advised claimants and defendants in multi-party actions.