The Dekagram: 5th May 2026

A quick by reminder this week that the new Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements (Amendment) Regulations 2026 are now in force. In summary, the new Regulations amend the existing 2018 Regulations in relation to holiday contracts entered into after 6^th April 2027 to:

• add a further category to the definition of “package” where travel services are provided to a traveller under separate contracts with individual service providers, if a single trader has facilitated, on the occasion of a single visit to, or contact with, the trader’s point of sale, the separate selection of and separate payment for each of the travel services by the traveller (thus subsuming some linked travel arrangements into the definition);
• remove the category of linked travel arrangements altogether (thus removing other linked travel arrangements from protection);
• provide additional rights to refund and redress enforceable by organisers against suppliers.

The full text of the Regulations is to be found here: The Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements (Amendment) Regulations 2026. No doubt these amendments will be the subject of lively discussion at the ABTA travel law seminar, which will take place on 12^th and 13^th May and which will feature contributions from Dominique Smith and Sarah Prager KC, who look forward to seeing many of our readers there: Travel Law Seminar | Events | ABTA

In the meantime, we give you an analysis of a knotty limitation problem which has exercised the team on a number of occasions over the years, and which Julia Brechtelsbauer has now answered definitively.

Limitation in Personal Injury Cases engaging the Equality Act 2010: an Overview

Specialising in travel law means that international injury lawyers are perhaps more readily creatures of statute over their common-law negligence domestic counterparts. The Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018, and the 1995 Merchant Shipping Act, section 183, as amended by the Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Passengers by Sea) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/3152), are to name but a few of the statutes which a travel lawyer may encounter in their practice. The travel lawyers’ fluency with such statutes provide them with an advantage when considering modern personal injury law, which can include sui generis claims under statute, such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010.

When looking at such sui generis causes of action – there can be a prima facie tension. Take for example s.118(1) of the Equality Act 2010. It reads:

S.118 Time limits  

(1) Subject to section 140AA proceedings on a claim within section 114 may not be brought after the end of— 

(a) the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the claim relates, or 

(b) such other period as the county court or sheriff thinks just and equitable. 

Whilst an Equality Act claim could be without any personal injury, it is possible for causes of action to be causally linked to, and therefore involve a claim for, personal injury. For example, imagine that the Claimant has been invited for an interview. The Claimant tells the interviewing business that they suffer from epilepsy. They are then mistakenly showed a video within the interview with flashing lights, thereby causing a fit. This could be a legally actionable discrimination which results in personal injury.

However, it is equally possible for that factual scenario to amount to negligence. Negligence as a cause of action has a proscribed time limit of six years (s.2 Limitation Act 1980). However, when that negligence results in personal injury, the limitation is 3 years from the date of knowledge / accrual of the cause of action (s.11(4) Limitation Act 1980). This is even the case where that negligence cause of action is “mixed” and equally results in damage which is not personal injury (Azaz v Denton [2009] EWHC 1759); the personal injury time limit takes precedence.

The question is, therefore, what limitation period applies to a sui generis claim, such as that under the Equality Act (or for example the Human Rights Act), which proscribes a short limitation, in contradiction to that required by s.11 of the Limitation Act for personal injury?

A travel case appears to help us to the answer. In Higham v Stena Sealink Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1107it was held that s.39 Limitation Act 1980 did not exclude the application of the 1980 Act to the Athens Convention.

s.39 of the Limitation Act 1980 reads:

s.39 Saving for other limitation enactments

This Act shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) or to any action or arbitration to which the Crown is a party and for which, fi it were between subjects, a period of limitation would be prescribed by or under any such other enactment.

Article 16 (3) of the Athens Convention said “the law of the court seised of the case shall govern the grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods”. Therefore, the Court of Appeal suggested that it should be read as “The Limitation Act 1980 shall govern the grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods…”. Of course, what a travel lawyer knows this case for, is that s.33 Limitation Act 1980 will not be of assistance to a Claimant outside of limitation, because that is a discretionary extension of limitation, not “suspension” or “interruption” of limitation. However, implicit within the reasoning is that the shorter, Athens Convention limitation, will apply in place of s.11(4) Limitation Act 1980.

Given the logic of that case, it would suggest that s.39 Limitation Act 1980 operates as a conduit for shorter limitation periods, such as that proscribed by the Equality Act, to take precedence over the 3-year limitation to personal injury otherwise mandated by the Limitation Act 1980.

It may be an argument that any reliance on s.39 Limitation Act 1980 somewhat puts the cart before the horse, because it is dependent on finding that, for example, s.118(1)(a) Equality Act gives a 6 month time limit for “pure” equality act claims, and such claims which result in personal injury. However, when reading s.118(1)(a) Equality Act 2010, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature did not intend for this short limit to also apply to actions involving personal injury.

Providing a shorter time limit to an action involving personal injury than the 3-year limit within s.11(4) of the Limitation Act 190 has difficulties. I highlight three main concerns:

1. The 3-year limitation period in personal injury is a balance between the collection of evidence to support the personal injury claim, whilst ensuring that evidence in relation to liability is not stale. A solicitor would have to be very efficient to comply with 6-month limitation and have an acceptable Part 35 expert report as to the Claimant’s injuries (as required to be served with the Particulars by PD 16 4.3).
2. The Personal Injury protocol provides for time limits in relation to the Defendant’s response; 21 days for initial reply in relation to an insurer, and then 3 months from that date of acknowledgment in relation to liability (Paragraph 6.2 and 6.3). In order to comply with the protocol, and bring their claim within a 6 month limitation period, the Claimant would have to send a letter of claim very swiftly after the accrual of the cause of action – at around the 2-month mark. This is incredibly swift if the Claimant is undergoing recovery for their personal injury. This is also assuming that the Defendant complies with those time limits. It is not unimaginable that in order to comply with the 6-month limitation, a Claimant may be forced to issue a claim where neither the position on indemnity nor liability has been confirmed. Neither of which is very attractive.
3. S.33 Limitation Act 1980 is a test which has listed considerations. This conflicts with the wide discretion of courts under s.118(1)(b) of the Equality Act 1980, and s.7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

I would suggest these tensions are caused by the fact that s.11 Limitation Act 1980 focuses on the damage whereas, for example, the Equality Act focuses on the cause of action.

In the case of both the Equality Act 2010, and the Human Rights act 1998, there is a neat solution. Both Acts provide for wide discretion, as already alluded to. A way to interpret the Limitation Act 1980 s.11(4) 3-year limitation consistently with such acts, is to say that the discretion ought to be engaged where the action involves personal injury, so long as the action was commenced before the personal injury limitation expiring.

So, take my earlier interviewee example. Say that the claim was issued 2.5 years after the discrimination/negligence, because that is the time in which the claimant was able to obtain a report, have indemnity confirmed, and for liability to be denied. My analysis would suggest that a judge ought to exercise their discretion under s.118(1)(b) because the claim involves personal injury (and also the need to comply with the pre-action protocol, and serve a part 35 report with the particulars).

I was recently successful in applying to the court to exercise its discretion under s.118(1)(b) when the claim was issued 3 years after the accrual of the cause of action (and therefore in time for the negligence action, but 2.5 years out of time for the Equality Act claim). Leaning on provisions of the pre-action protocol, the fact of injury (and recovery) of the Claimant, the Defendant’s concession that the claim would proceed in negligence in any event, as well as the Defendant’s delayed pre-action response both in terms of indemnity and liability caused the court to exercise its discretion and allow the claim to proceed. The Claimant will now benefit from favourable aspects of the Equality Act, such as the reversal of the burden of proof.

About the Author

Julia Brechtelsbauer gained tenancy having completed pupillage at Deka Chambers. Before coming to the Bar, she took an LLM in Comparative Private Law at the University of Edinburgh, and during this time she also tutored tort and EU law privately at undergraduate level. Studying Law with Spanish Law at the University of Oxford, Julia came first in her cohort in EU Law and Comparative Private Law, placing 5th overall. She has also been published by the Oxford University Undergraduate Law Journal, focusing on the defence of illegality in tort law. She has already been led by Sarah Prager KC in a paraplegia case involving complex issues around assumption of responsibility and is developing a thriving practice in international work.