The Dekagram: 16th March 2026

This week Linda Nelson considers an issue of crucial importance, and one that comes up more frequently than you would think: how and when it is permissible for parties to resile from admissions of liability, and John Schmitt reports on two recent, and completely different, examples of using new powers. First, John looks at the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) making its first use of new powers to fine businesses, and then turns his attention to an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to harness the power of technology in litigation.

Withdrawal of admissions: Ramsdale v Ditta & Ors [2026] EWHC 544 (KB)

The recent judgment in the case of Ramsdale v Ditta & Ors [2026] EWHC 544 (KB) serves as a useful reminder of the approach taken by courts to CPR 14.5 and the factors relevant to an application for permission to withdraw an admission.

In Ramsdale, Cs claim arose from alleged failures by a number of medical practitioners to diagnose chronic rhinosinusitis. One of the defendants (D5) was a nurse who C had consulted. In D5’s response to the Letter of Claim she admitted that she had failed to consult the notes of Cs earlier consultations and in her pleaded Defence she admitted that that failure amounted to a breach of duty. In May 2025 she filed an application for permission to withdraw that admission.

When the application was heard in January 2026, the Judge considered CPR 14.5, which provides a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to such an application, and the overriding objective. CPR 14.5 provides that in deciding whether to give permission for an admission to be withdrawn, the court shall consider all the circumstances of the case, including the following factors.

• The grounds for seeking to withdraw the admission
• Here, D5’s initial nursing expert ceased to be available for medico-legal work and so a new expert was instructed. That expert disagreed with his predecessor and concluded that D5’s admitted failure to check Cs notes did not amount to a breach of duty.
• Whether there is new evidence that was not available when the admission was made
• D5 accepted that this normally refers to new factual evidence that had become available (rather than expert evidence) but submitted that the underlying consideration was whether new material had become available that, through no fault of the relevant party, had not been available at the time the admission was made.
• The conduct of the parties
• The Judge said he had ‘considerable concern’ about the fact that for a significant period of time (during which  the parties were preparing for trial) D5 had not taken any step to alert the other parties to the fact that an issue was likely to arise as to her admission, or that there would be delays in addressing this issue with her expert. Following the Letter of Response in November 2022 (admitting that earlier notes had not been consulted) and the Defence in August 2023 (admitting breach of duty), D5’s solicitor told the other parties in July 2024 that due to an issue with the availability of the initial expert a new expert had been instructed. However, no issue was raised by D5 as to her admissions at the first CMC in July 2024, or when D5’s witness statement was served in October 2024 or at a second CMC in December 2024. In particular, when D5 served her Amended Defence in February 2025, the admissions were repeated, despite the fact that there was at least doubt as to whether those admissions were to be maintained. It was not until May 2025 that D5 served the report of her new expert on C and filed the application for permission to resile from the admissions of breach. The application was heard in January 2026.
• The Judge held that the delay in raising the issue was ‘deplorable and inexcusable’ and observed that if this were the sole criterion, he would have no hesitation in refusing the application. However, he noted that in this case priority should be given to the next factor: whether there has been prejudice occasioned by what has occurred.
• Any prejudice to any person if the admission is withdrawn or not permitted to be withdrawn
• C highlighted that the prejudice to him included the derailing of the trial preparation (although it was accepted that the trial window in June 2026 would not be lost) and the additional costs that would incurred.
• D5 accepted that C would suffer a degree of prejudice if the application were allowed (as he had proceeded for a significant period of time on the understanding that breach was admitted) but submitted that (1) that prejudice was mitigated by the fact that C already had an expert instructed who addressed the issue of breach and who could assist on that issue further without any significant difficulty and (2) the real prejudice would be suffered by D5 if she were not able to defend herself against the allegations of professional negligence despite having expert evidence to support her case.
• The Judge agreed with D5: she would potentially suffer very significant prejudice if she were not able to advance her case to its best advantage by relying on expert evidence that the failures in question were not unreasonable, where it was not her fault that that evidence had not been available to her at an earlier stage. This was not a case of expert shopping.
• What stage the proceedings have reached, in particular, whether a date or period has been fixed for the trial
• The trial window in June 2026 was not imperilled, but preparation (in particular joint expert reports) would be significantly delayed.
• The prospects of success of the claim or of the part of it to which the admission relates
• The parties argued about whether the new expert’s evidence as to breach of duty was tenable and in particular whether the expert had properly considered the full content of D5s statement and her contemporaneous notes. The Judge noted that that matter remained unresolved, but the fact that C had material on which to base a challenge to the expert was relevant to the issue of the extent of prejudice to C if the application were allowed.
• The interests of the administration of justice
• The Judge accepted C’s argument that admissions play an important part in the proper administration of justice (in that they serve to define and focus the issues in  proceedings) particularly where expert evidence is to be called, and accepted C’s complaint that the new expert was permitted/encouraged to express his opinion on matters that were no longer in issue (breach having been admitted). However, given the potential significant prejudice to D5, it was in the interests of justice that D5 be permitted to resile from her admission of breach.

Accordingly, that permission was granted. At C’s request, the court gave that permission on condition that D5 disclose the report(s) of her initial expert, following Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon Plc (the Court cannot compel a party to disclose a report subject to litigation privilege, but can make permission to rely on a new report conditional upon disclosure of the first). The Court did not accede to Cs further request for disclosure of the early drafts of the report(s) of D5’s new expert: privilege was not waived in respect of those drafts and such an order was not specifically addressed in Edwards-Tubb.  

About the Author

Linda Nelson was called in 2000 and is ranked in both the Legal 500 and Chambers and Partners for her travel law work. Linda regularly advises in international personal injury cases with cross-border issues, particularly those falling within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. She is well-versed in claims involving the international carriage conventions, the package holiday regulations, Merchant Shipping regulations, ship collisions and issues of jurisdiction, applicable law and limitation. She is a contributing author to Munkman on Employers’ Liability (writing the ‘Shipping and Workers on Ships’ chapter) and co-authored ‘Work Accidents at Sea’ (now in its second edition).

CMA fines for non-compliance

The CMA’s new power was granted by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (“DMCCA”) which amended Schedule 5 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

This power allows the CMA to fine businesses for failing to comply with information requests. Such information notices are formal demands issued by the CMA that legally require businesses to provide information. The maximum penalties the CMA can impose for this failure are a fixed sum of £30,000 or (if higher) 1% of the business’ turnover and/or a daily penalty of £15,000 of (if higher) 5% of the business’ daily turnover.

Information notices can require businesses to provide a wide range of information, such as copies of emails, meeting notes, or details about internal roles and responsibilities.

Here, Euro Car Parks Limited were fined for their failure to respond to a legal information notice. The penalty does not relate at this stage to any alleged infringement of consumer protection law.

However, the CMA tried on seven separate occasions to obtain a response from this company for initial information. Eventually, after three months, and when under threat of the fine being imposed, the company responded and in the process explained that they had blocked the CMA’s emails, stating that they believed they were fraudulent, and attempts to scam the firm.

The explanation was evidently regarded to be wholly unsatisfactory as the CMA has fined the company 75% of the maximum possible fixed charge: a total of £473,000. This is clearly designed to send a significant message about the consequences of non-compliance, and provide a warning shot to other businesses coming into CMA’s orbit.

Euro Car Parks Limited have appealed the decision.

UAB Business Enterprise & Anor v Oneta Ltd & Ors [2026] EWHC 543 (Ch) (11 March 2026)

This may be a new low in the attempt to harness the power of technology in the law courts: the recent judgment of Judge Agenello KC (a claim about the ownership of a company) sees, remarkably, a witness caught out using the technology of “smart glasses” while giving evidence.

Depending on the age of the readership, glasses armed with technology are familiar gadgets seen in James Bond, Mission Impossible and Joe 90. Here, they did not fire lasers, explode or provide X-ray vision, but the judge held [at 118]:

“In my judgment, the smart glasses were clearly connected to his mobile phone during his cross examination because no voice was heard out loud until his smart glasses were removed and disconnected from his glasses… I accept that (the witness) was being assisted or coached in his replies to questions put to him during cross examination until this was stopped.”

The ruse was discovered during the course of his evidence after cross-examining counsel heard some interference coming from the witness, and this was confirmed by the interpreter. He was asked to remove his smart glasses by the judge. After a few further questions, when the interpreter was in the process of translating a question, the judgment sets out that the mobile phone of the witness –

“started broadcasting out loud with the voice of someone talking. There was clearly someone on the mobile phone talking to (him). He then removed his mobile phone from his inner jacket pocket. At my direction, the smart glasses and his mobile were placed into the hands of his solicitor.”

After the mobile phone was analysed for meta data, it was seen that various calls were made in the morning of the witness’s evidence to someone recorded on his phone as ‘abra kadabra’, and indeed this person was called just before the witness started his evidence. When asked who is abra kadabra, the witness replied that it was a taxi driver.

The judge found the witness untruthful and rejected his evidence in its entirety.

This is an extraordinary, and thankfully incompetent, attempt to have evidence covertly influenced with coaching and assistance. We can only hope it does not herald the malign use of technology from bad faith actors and in the meantime we can stay vigilant.

About the Author

John Schmitt was called in 2013 and now specialises in complex personal injury work. He is also experienced in representing families at inquests in a clinical negligence context and has done so through the AvMA pro-bono inquest service. Most recently he has represented a family at a four day jury inquest at the conclusion of which the deceased’s employer was ordered to produce a Prevention of Future Deaths report. He is described by the Legal 500 as having a ‘lovely manner about him’ but being ‘as sharp as a tack’.