Success for Andrew Warnock KC, Jack Harding and Gurion Taussig in the Supreme Court

News

21/01/2026

The Supreme Court has ruled that claims for compensation by a man who killed three people, but was acquitted by a jury in the Crown Court on the grounds of insanity, are barred by the doctrine of illegality. The Claimant, Mr Lewis-Ranwell, sought damages from a mental health trust, Devon County Council as the provider of approved mental health workers, and G4S as the employer of forensic medical examiners, on the grounds that they had negligently failed to section him under the Mental Health Act 1983 whilst he was in custody for other offences. His case was that had he been sectioned, he would have been detained, treated and not carried out the killings. As it was, he was released from custody and bludgeoned three innocent men to death whilst acting under a psychotic delusion that they were paedophiles. On being found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was, as required by law, committed indefinitely to a secure hospital. He sought damages for, among other things, his resultant detention at Broadmoor hospital, damage to reputation and loss of earnings. The defendants applied to strike out the claims on the grounds that they were barred by illegality. For the purposes of the application, it was assumed that the Claimant would otherwise establish his case on negligence and causation (although these were not admitted).

The High Court declined to strike out the claim, holding that because Mr Lewis-Ranwell had not known what he was doing was wrong, and had been acquitted of criminal responsibility, the illegality defence was not engaged.

The Court of Appeal, by a majority (Andrews LJ dissenting), dismissed the defendants’ appeal.

The Supreme Court (Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lady Rose and Lady Simler) unanimously allowed the defendants’ further appeal. The court held that an act did not have to be criminal to engage the illegality defence. The culpability of a claimant was a factor to be considered at a later stage of the analysis, when considering whether it would be disproportionate to bar a claim. The killings were unlawful, worthy of public condemnation in themselves, and had engaged the interests of the state, which had made Mr Lewis-Ranwell the subject of a hospital order and restriction order. These factors were sufficient to engage the defence.

Having so concluded, the Supreme Court then applied the test for whether a claim should be barred by the defence, as set out in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. The court held that allowing the claim would introduce inconsistency and disharmony in the law. First, it would be inconsistent with the fact that Mr Lewis-Ranwell was lawfully detained in hospital pursuant to the order of the crown court. Secondly, it would be inconsistent with the fact that tort law does not recognise insanity as a defence to liability. Thirdly, the victims of the killings could not sue the defendant authorities in tort, and it would bring the law into disrepute if the killer could. Fourthly, it would allow the claimant to attribute responsibility for his tortious acts to someone else. Fifthly, it could lead to the estate of a negligent psychiatrist being liable to a patient who killed him, a conundrum which had been posed by one of the judges in the analogous Australian case of Hunter Area Health Service v Presland [2005] NSWCA 33. Allowing the claim to proceed would also damage confidence in the legal system, as members of the public would be profoundly concerned and surprised if the Claimant could recover damages for the consequences of his wrongful acts. The impact on mental health service budget was also a consideration, as was the risk of inconsistent verdicts about a claimant’s mental state in the criminal and civil courts. Countervailing policies did not outweigh these: inquest and public enquiries provide a better forum for learning lessons and improving standards than civil proceedings; applying the defence did not divorce it from concepts of illegality or morality – the Claimant’s conduct must be regarded as unlawful for the purposes of the illegality defence.

Nor was it disproportionate to bar the claims: the Claimant’s conduct was of the utmost seriousness, central to the claims and whether or not he was aware of the nature and quality of his acts, those acts amounted to unlawful killing.

Andrew Warnock KC and Jack Harding, instructed by DWF Law LLP (London), represented Devon County Council and Gurion Taussig, led by Angus Moon KC and instructed by G4S Legal Department, London, represented G4S Health Services (UK) Limited.

Featured Counsel

Andrew Warnock KC

Call 1993 | Silk 2012

Gurion Taussig

Call 2001

Jack Harding

Call 2004

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