While funeral expenses should be pleaded in all fatal accidents cases, Cyrus Katrak warns practitioners to beware of Brown –v- Hamid [2013] EWHC 4067 (QB). In that case the Defendant was found to have accelerated the Claimant’s pre-existing symptoms and death. The judge found that the period of acceleration was around 12 months.
When considering the claim for funeral expenses, the Judge noted: “However although damages for the recovery of funeral expenses “may” be recovered and indeed usually are recovered under s.3(5) of the 1976 Act, in the circumstances of this case, namely the acceleration of the symptoms associated with a pre-existing condition by a relatively short period of time, I do not consider that it would be appropriate to make such an award.”
I do not consider that this was a correct decision. We all die, so in a sense every Fatal Accident Claim is an accelerated death case. As to that period of acceleration, does death 1 day / 1 month / 1 year earlier prevent an award of funeral expenses? This seems completely arbitrary.
The Judge’s reasoning also seems at odds given that he awarded bereavement damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
There is also conflict on this point in respect of living Claimant’s whose life expectancy has been shortened. In Bateman v. Hydro Agri (UK) Ltd (September 15, 1995) a High Court judge held that funeral expenses were a valid claim. The claimant was suffering from mesothelioma and was likely to die within three months of the date of the trial.
However, in Watson –v- Cakebread Robey Ltd [2009] EWHC 1695 (QB) the Judge held that funeral expenses are not recoverable by a living claimant whose life expectancy was reduced by 9 months, although of course, once the Claimant died a claim could presumably have been brought under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934.
Thus there is plenty of scope for Claimants to argue these points should they be raised by Defendants in their defence or at trial.
This week Anirudh Mandagere gives us the most lucid explanation we have yet seen of the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference [2026] UKSC 16 relating to deprivation of liberty. We also bring news, from Robbie Parkin and Dominique…
The recent ruling by the Supreme Court has reversed over a decade of understanding deprivation of liberty. This Dekinar focuses on the impact of the judgment for those involved in Court of Protection proceedings as well as practical tips on how to navigate the new…
Written by experienced members of the Deka Chambers Clinical Negligence Practice Group, the 5th edition of Clinical Negligence Claims: A Practical Guide provides a valuable reference source for clinical negligence practitioners, with insights into still developing areas of law. The book covers the intricacies of investigating breach of duty…
Deka Chambers: 5 Norwich Street, London EC4A 1DR